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For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ Introduction This paper uses traditional doctrinal legal methodology to evaluate judicial statements on global claims, drawing on key authorities from a number of jurisdictions and from the realms of health and safety law and professional negligence. The purpose of this paper is to examine relevant case law governing the failure and/or success of global or rolled-up claims. It proposes a theoretical framework to improve a claimant's prospect of success in advancing a global claim, not only in circumstances where it may be impractical or impossible to provide a breakdown but also where a cost benefit analysis concludes it is logical and reasonable to do so. Global claims, if advanced correctly, could significantly reduce the costs of litigating complex construction disputes.
The starting point
The general rule as regards a claimant being compensated in damages for breach of contract was set out by Lord Blackburn in these terms:
'in settling the sum of money to be given for reparation of damages you should as nearly as possible get at that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he has not sustained the wrong. ' [1 In other words, the wronged party, so far as money can do it, should be placed in the same position as if the contract had been performed.
]
Contractors may find themselves in the position of having suffered a loss on a particular project and consider the whole of that loss is attributable to breaches of contract by the client. Contractors may then proceed, in a seemingly generalised and simplistic way, to present a claim for the total "loss" as a measure of damage which should compensate them for the harm suffered.
The claimant's right to be compensated for harm done should also be balanced up with the rights of the defendant as set out by Lord Justice Saville:
'The basic purpose of pleadings is to enable the opposing party to know what case is being made in sufficient detail to enable that party properly to prepare to answer it.'[2 ]
The global claim authorities Global or 'rolled up claims' occur when the claimant presents a claim with no breakdown in the sense that, rather than showing how each individual event has caused delay together with the monetary loss attached to each delay, the claimant provides a single claim lumping each alleged cause together without itemisation. Such an approach under normal circumstances:
'is the antithesis of a claim where the causal nexus between the wrongful act or omission of the defendant and the loss of the plaintiff has been clearly and intelligibly pleaded. ' There are warnings against the danger of a global claim failing completely if any significant part of the delay is not established and the court finds no basis for awarding less than the whole (Keating, 2006 
at 384. Under this method, the contractor must show: (1) the impracticability of proving actual losses directly; (2) the reasonableness of its bid; (3) the reasonableness of its actual costs; and (4) lack of responsibility for the added costs.'[25 ]
In finding that the claimant's bid (Servidone) was unreasonable, the Claims Court applied a modified total cost method and 'substituted a reasonable bid amount for Servidone's original estimate.' The court also considered the effect on contractor's costs of 'performance inefficiencies. '[26 ] Judge Thornton asked a number of questions in How Engineering v Lindner as to how the Lindner claim could be scaled down if some of the causative events alleged had been eliminated or to take account of defects, inefficiencies or events at Lindner's risk [27 ] .
Support for an apportionment process may be found in the words of Mr Justice Donaldson in Crosby who supported the arbitrators strategy in recognising that a claim does not need to be fully global or fully detailed but, that the contractor should particularise where possible and then ascertain his losses through a global claim where it was not possible by saying; Winter (2007: 11) argues that this type of approach reverses the burden of proof.
In order to prevent the burden of proof being transferred away from the claimant, the claimant may be required to "open his books" and lead evidence to indicate what his own failings might be so that the court can attribute quantum to those failings. The claimant may also be required to lead similar evidence to indicate other issues not the fault of the defendant so that, again, the court can attribute quantum to those liabilities.
A rational apportionment of the global claim or a reasoned deduction from the whole can then be made without, necessarily, reversing the burden of proof.
After this review of the authorities, the following ingredients for a global claim can be distilled:
• The meanings apparently being interchangeable and absolute. This paper has considered American authorities and it is worth noting that the definitions of impossible, impractical, impracticable can shed some of their absolute meaning if the meaning of impractical is taken to include the words 'not sensible or realistic' as may be found within the New Oxford American Dictionary 2nd Edition. In In some cases, the courts have balanced up the needs of the claimant to add to his case by serving further and better particulars in order to assist the defendant to understand the case he has to answer [31 ] .
In considering whether the claimant advances a global claim or not, it should also be recognised that such a claim is 'a risky enterprise '[32] particularly if absolute definitions are given to phrases such as impossible, impractical and impracticable as may be found in various judicial statements made in considering global claims. But we also see some relaxing of the absolute terms when the court uses words such as 'adequate' [33] or 'sufficient'[34 ] particularity.
Sufficient or adequate particularity
The seemingly absolute requirement of impossibility could be assimilated with an obligation to use best endeavours. To that end, should a claimant use his best endeavours and 'leave no stone unturned '[35 ] either before he presents his claim or at any time through to trial? Or should he be required to use reasonable endeavours to produce adequate or sufficient particularity?
Although Judge Flaux was not convinced the distinction between best and reasonable endeavours made much difference on the facts of the case before him in Rhodia v Huntsman, he nevertheless addressed his mind to the distinction and drew the following conclusion: 
In that context, it may well be that an obligation to use all reasonable endeavours equates with using best endeavours .... ' '35. Accordingly, in so far as it is necessary to decide this point, I agree with Mr Edwards-Stuart that an obligation to use reasonable endeavours is less stringent than one to use best endeavours. As to what reasonable endeavours might entail, he relied upon a recent decision of Lewison J in Yewbelle v London Green Developments [2006] EWHC 3166 (Ch) at paragraphs 122-3 where the judge concluded that Yewbelle was not required to sacrifice its own commercial interests.'[36 ]
Judge Flaux appeared to conclude that best endeavours equated to all reasonable endeavours and that reasonable endeavours was a lower requirement. Some consideration as to the cost consequences of each was not considered except in terms of sacrificing and/or acting against the parties' own commercial interests.
Time, trouble and expense are factors to be taken into consideration when weighing up whether statutory defences in health and safety law are proven.
In Coltness Iron Co v Sharp, Lord Atkin said: 'the time of non protection is so short, and the time, trouble and expense of any other form of protection is so disproportionate that I think the defence is proved.'[37 ]
In Edwards v National Coal Board, the Court of Appeal gave broad support to Lord Atkin's construction of the phrase 'reasonably practicable'. In particular, Lord Justice Asquith came to the conclusion that:
'Reasonably practicable" is a narrower term than "physically possible" and seems to me to imply that a computation must be made by the owner, in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in money, time or trouble) is placed in the other; and that if it be shown that there is a gross disproportion between them ... the defendants discharge the onus on them.'[38 ]
Here we see some discussion of a balance being struck and a question of proportionality (albeit "gross proportionality"). The health and safety authorities and published guidance do not appear to define what constitutes the distinction between proportionality or gross proportionality. What is clear in relation to the duties of a designer under the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007 is that those duties to perform "so far as is reasonably practicable" is qualified by having to take
'due account of other relevant design considerations"[39] and, according to CDM ACOP (Managing Health and Safety in Construction, 2007), in doing so the designer should "weigh the various factors and reach reasoned, professional decisions'[40 ]
The striking of a balance 
Deciding what is reasonably practicable to control risks involves the exercise of judgement.'[41 ]
Even though the obligation appears to be akin to an absolute obligation in health and safety law i.e. to comply so far as is reasonably practicable, there appears to be an element of proportionality and the exercise of judgement.
The standard to be expected of a professional in exercising judgement may be found in the widely recognised direction to the jury set out by Judge [45 ] This paper proposes that even where there are seemingly absolute definitions, the court leans towards a cost benefit analysis. Specifically with regard to global claims, Judge Thornton stipulated that the approach to providing sufficient particularity must be 'cost effective' [46 ] .
The Jackson Review
Judge Thornton considered Amec's behaviour as against the overriding objectives of the Civil Procedure rules in determining whether its costs were reasonable or unnecessary:
'It is clear that Amec acted reasonably in taking decisions which, in effect, sought to give effect to these overriding objectives. Given the size of the tasks and the uncertainties involved, Amec is not necessarily to be faulted if some of the steps taken can be seen with hindsight to have been unnecessary or involved unnecessary expenditure. In considering whether Amec should be entitled to all or the major part of its reasonably incurred costs, it is necessary to test the steps that were taken by reference to their reasonableness taken against this background.'[47 ]
Building on the principles of access to justice enshrined in the Civil Procedure Rules, The Jackson Review (2009) linked access to justice, proportionate costs and practicable coming to the conclusion that:
'Proportionate costs make access to justice practicable. Access to justice is only practicable if the costs of litigation are proportionate. '[48 ] The Jackson Review set out guidelines to help the Rules Committee to formulate a definition of proportionate costs which, he hoped, would bear a reasonable relationship with such matters as: the sums in issue; complexity; any additional work generated by the conduct of the paying party [49] . He also considered that oppressive conduct by wealthy litigants in putting their opponents to excessive and disproportionate costs should be sanctioned by indemnity costs with the proposed definition of proportionate costs protecting a receiving party even where indemnity costs are not awarded[50
'The policy which underlies the proposed new rule is that cost benefit analysis has a part to play, even in the realm of civil justice.'[
]. What is also important to consider is that Lord Justice Jackson went on to say: 51 ] (emphasis added) So both a claimant and a defendant are required to conduct a cost benefit analysis as to the detail and extent of their pleadings and evidence. This is particularly relevant to construction claims which can be voluminous especially where Scott Schedules are required.
The Framework
The claimant and the defendant should conduct a defensible cost benefit analysis before deciding on which combination of steps set out below, or any combination of them, is chosen in order to assist the court to come to a cost effective determination of the issues in dispute between them:
1. All causative events the responsibility of the Defendant a. Prepare whole of claim with sufficient particularity to ensure Defendant knows the case he has to meet. b. Where not all the elements are capable of particularisation, provide sufficient particularity for those parts that can be and globally claim the rest. 2. Some causative events not the responsibility of the Defendant a. Prepare whole of claim with sufficient particularity to ensure Defendant knows the case he has to meet and identify those elements (with a quantum range) that may not be the Defendant's liability, b. Isolate those elements of claim that can be attributable to the Defendant and provide sufficient particularity where it is possible to do so. Globally claim the rest and identify those elements (with a range of quantum) that may not be the Defendants liability. c. Ensure sufficient evidence is properly led to enable the court to apportion and/or reduce the value of any globally claimed elements. This may include open book type consideration of tender costs and/or performance inefficiencies and/or defects that are the claimant's responsibility. The evidence to be led should enable the court to conduct an appropriate apportionment or make an appropriate deduction without reversing the burden of proof.
Conduct
This paper closes on the discussion of a proposed framework by providing a reminder of what happened in Wharf and the effect of conduct on the outcome of proceedings in global claim cases. Wharf had been ordered to, and agreed to provide further and better particulars using Scott Schedules, which they did not do. To that extent, it could be argued that the failure of the global claim in this instance was not a matter of principle in respect of global claims but procedural failure and a matter of conduct of the claimant.
Conduct of the claimant was also considered in 54 It would appear the Judge had certain sympathy to ICI's situation however, despite ICI's considerable work the defendant was still not fully aware of the case they had to meet. Wharf was reconsidered; their Lordships commented that if a pleading was to embarrass the fair process of trial, it could not be considered in isolation from the litigation history. Wharf had lasted seven years and they had conceded their claim needed further particularisation, which they failed to do and were criticised for that failure. In contrast, ICI had put considerable work into proceedings that had been active for a much shorter period i.e. two years and were continually praised. The decision in ICI could therefore be applauded for its pragmatism.
]
The courts commented on the behaviour of the defendant in Amec were ultimately successful with their largely global claim. On the question of costs, Judge Thornton concluded that the defendant had: rejected the claims without any detailed reasoning; rejected mediation; failed to react proactively when the claimant had prepared and pleaded its case, failed to plead in detail in its defence and sought to make general and unsubstantiated assertions in attempts to prolong the litigation. Judge Thornton criticised 'Stork's continuous and obstructive obfuscation' [59] as being at the heart of its failure to produce evidence which contributed greatly to the time and costs Amec expended in preparing and presenting the case by both sides. Judge Thornton considered this case to fall within 'one of those exceptional cases where indemnity costs should be awarded even if there is no disapproval of Stork's conduct.' [60 The criticisms levelled at the defendants in Inserco v Honeywell[ ] Judge Thornton nevertheless, disapproved of the manner in which Stork's overall case was presented. Amec were therefore awarded indemnity costs in addition to being successful with their global claim. [62] are arguably at the heart of the Jackson Review's discussion on prolix pleadings (with specific reference to TCC proceedings) which centred around re-pleading and/or disallowing costs at the end of the case [63] . Lord Justice Jackson suggested that the TCC Guide be amended to give power to the court to disallow costs where pleadings or witness statements contained extensive irrelevant or peripheral material with further emphasis on focussing on key issues at Pre-Trial Review[64
61] and Amec v Stork

Conclusion
].
The basic premise for presenting a claim in whatever form, whether it be a global claim in whole or in part, is that the defendant needs to know the case he has to meet so that there may be a fair trial of the issues. The global claim authorities appear to indicate that the claimant need only present his claim in sufficient or adequate particularity providing a balance is struck between a claimants' right to be compensated and a defendants' right to be able to respond. Those authorities also indicate that the claim needs to be dealt with expeditiously and economically and in a cost effective manner.
The trend in other areas of law, including health and safety and professional negligence, is that there needs to be a cost benefit analysis approach to the exercise of judgement in any decisions taken. The recent Jackson review adds further support to the cost benefit analysis to civil justice. This paper concludes that a cost benefit analysis requires a claimant to present his claim with sufficient particularity. Where that cost benefit analysis is defensible and can demonstrate the advancement of a global claim is cost effective so that the trial would be fair, a global claim should be the norm for all claims. This is particularly so where it can be demonstrated that all the events complained of are the fault of the defendant. The approach may nevertheless require the claimant to particularise those elements of the claim which are related to key issues.
A claimant does however need to ensure that he cannot be criticised for either asking the court to do his work for him and/or seek to reverse the burden of proof onto the defendant. In order to do that, a claimant may be permitted greater opportunity to present a global claim, even where there are elements that are not the defendants fault, provided always that the claimant opens up his books to be scrutinised in order to provide the court with appropriate evidence to show that a rational apportionment can be made and/or to particularise those elements that are not the fault of the defendant. To assist the court, the claimant should lead evidence and provide sufficient particularity with a breakdown of those elements that may be attributable to inefficiencies in the claimants own claim or low bid costs or to third parties or to events that are the fault of neither party. If there are any uncertainties present with individual parts of the claim, the claimant should separate those parts of the claim to prove the absolute integrity of their case. In a sense, the claimant should be "whiter than white". It may prove fatal to the claimants case if he does not lead evidence in the manner proposed.
If a claimant conducts his case in this way, the court may be in a position to apportion upwards on certain elements, if it is felt to be correct at trial.
With an appropriate cost benefit analysis, it may be cost effective to present even a claim that can be particularised as a global claim provided there is sufficient particularisation of a deduction, from the globally claimed amount, with ranges of quantum attached to the particulars so that the court can see that the claimant has come to a reasoned conclusion on presenting his claim. A defendant should, nevertheless, be wary of seeking further particularity where it is not really necessary and it remains clear to the court the defendant is reasonably aware of the case he has to meet.
